Jürgen Moltmann as a Reformed theologian

In the latest issue of the Evangelical Quarterly, Nigel Wright has a fascinating article on the early theology of Jürgen Moltmann. Through an appraisal of his early (untranslated) works, Wright reveals the great extent to which Moltmann was self-consciously working within the Reformed tradition, beginning as a historical theologian covering the 16th century and as a student of Otto Weber. Regardless of whether you think Moltmann was too Hegelian and perhaps too Lutheran, you should be stimulated by his interpretation of varying Reformed trajectories, as either rationalistic or empirical-historical. These sort of categories tend to be too neat and easily controverted, but helpful all the same. Here is a snippet from Wright’s article, summarizing Moltmann’s interpretation of Beza and Ramus:

A conflict emerges therefore between the influential high Calvinism of the Beza school and the more historicist Ramist school generally opposed to it. The essence of the Ramist position was to take with a new seriousness a less abstract, less syllogistic, more empirical and practically engaged philosophy of history in the humanist tradition. This was seen in some Calvinist circles as a carrying through of the Protestant reformation into the realm of philosophy, the triumph of historical revelation over deductive philosophy. Over against Beza’s a priori, deductive approach to dogma, Ramus was positing a new a posteriori position which accented salvation history. In turn this was foundational for the growth of federal theology (foedus = covenant) which was rooted in the history of the biblical covenants.

…

Calvin by contrast [to the Beza school] was no speculative metaphysician but biblically speaking a rational empiricist, a dialectical positivist and a psychologist, patiently tracing the acts and works of God as revealed in salvation history and seeking to hold conflicting statements dialectically in tension. Ramism, and its effects upon later Calvinist recoveries of Calvin from the distorting impact of Beza’s approach, represented a legacy that was to form the basis of subsequent Calvinistic humanism, empiricism and pietism. It also contributed an impulse that would in time issue in the Enlightenment’s concern with history. For Moltmann, Petrus Ramus supports a recovery of the doctrine of predestination from its systematisation as a series of decrees and places it within the workings of the Triune God in history in intimate association with the purposes of God achieved through the covenants of God with humanity, with Israel and in Christ.

[Nigel Wright, "Predestination and perseverance in the early theology of Jürgen Moltmann," Evangelical Quarterly 83.4 (2011), 336-337. The article is available as a pdf on EBSCOhost, assuming you have access through a college or seminary account.]

I tend to see these two approaches (rationalistic and empirical-historical) as complementary and not necessarily opposed as Moltmann has it. Moltmann’s reading is likely skewed a bit by his disdain for double predestination. He has to see this doctrine as a rationalistic slip in Calvin’s otherwise historical and practical orientation, whereas I would see it as evidence for my own position that the categories are complementary (with Calvin being a model of this).

Edwards’ non-Reformed determinism

I imagine that most people who read this blog also have Scott Clark’s blog on their blog readers, but if you haven’t seen it Clark has posted a link to a fascinating lecture by Richard Muller at TEDS. Muller’s thesis is that Edwards’ treatise on Freedom of the Will used Enlightenment philosophical determinism, instead of the Thomist-Aristotelian compatibilism of Reformed scholasticism. So, whereas the Reformed scholastic categories allowed for a non-coerced freedom of will, while entirely circumscribed by the divine will, Edwards’ categories yielded a determinism proved by rationalist logic. This thesis is building off of the work found in Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Reformed Theology, which I thoroughly enjoyed. I love Edwards, but I’ve never liked his treatise on the will; so, it’s highly interesting to re-think Edwards’ argument in the light of the prior Reformed tradition and developments in philosophy.

By the way, although Barth is not happy with either Enlightenment or Aristotelian methods, his own defense of omni-causality (and attack on Molinism) is rather congruent with Muller, van Asselt, et al.‘s defense of the Reformed scholastic allotment for free choice.

Stephen Williams audio (doctrine of Election)

Yesterday, I was very happy to discover that Stephen Williams’ Kantzer Lectures, given last September at TEDS, are posted for streaming or download (scroll down to the bottom of the page). The topic is the doctrine of Election, namely whether it is possible to move beyond the Calvinist-Arminian impasse. I’ve listened to the first two lectures, and they are extremely fascinating. The second lecture deals with Karl Barth. Williams gives an excellent summation of Barth’s doctrine of Election, engaging with contemporary debates (including some criticism of McCormack). In the first half of the lecture, Williams offers a highly positive appraisal of Barth’s approach, but, in the second half of the lecture, he departs from Barth with some incisive criticism of his exegesis. He then offers some cautious psycho-analytical musings on Barth’s fear of natural theology and dislike of tragedy, in contrast with Brunner’s less worried approach to natural theology but (contra Barth) fear of universalism.

Stephen Williams is Professor of Systematic Theology at Union Theological College, Belfast. He is the author of Revelation and Reconciliation (Cambridge U. P., 1996) and The Shadow of the Antichrist: Nietzsche’s Critique of Christianity (Baker Academic, 2006).

‘Lost’ and theodicy

I’m catching-up on the last couple episodes of Lost. This last season has completely exceeded my expectations. It is amazing that a major network drama, with some of the highest ratings of all time, is built completely around the big themes of theodicy. The question of free will, the problem of evil, the hiddenness of God — all of this has converged in this last season and is given explicit expression through, more or less, biblical motifs.

So, I am curious why, among the dozens of theology blogs on my Google Reader, nobody is giving due attention to Lost, with the exception of some Catholic podcasts. Theology students are ignoring the most explicitly theological television show ever produced.

Reformed Thought on Freedom, pt. 3 (contingency)

This post continues a review series of Reformed Thought on Freedom (Baker, 2010), e.d. Willem J. van Asselt et al.

See part 1 and part 2.

In the previous post (pt. 2), we left off with the authors making the distinction between the first cause (God) and the second cause (man), where both causes are contingent, not necessary, in-themselves and yet act concurrently to yield one particular result. The most significant point, to my mind, admitted by the authors was that God creates a space “for the causal activity of his creatures.” The full quote is important enough to repeat:

We should be aware that this causal terminology does not imply a manipulative, causal relationship: God as the Creator initiates, sustains, empowers and governs all that exists, while leaving room for the causal activity of his creatures. God does not only stand at the beginning, but is present to every moment of time in providing life, powers, and possibilities for action. (p. 32)

This means that as a free (contingent) act the human person retains the possibilities for choosing among different possibility operators (Md or Me) yet “is guided to choose by itself for d.” So, what is possible — what can be done — is the issue under discussion, and the Reformed answer is that both (or more) are possible while one is actual. God does not coerce or manipulate the will of man in order to effect Md, but God does work within the free space of man’s will in order to influence or empower the will to the particular end as chosen by God.

Within the possibilities intrinsic to a particular number of objects presented to a man’s will, the objects under discernment are all possible — they could or could not be chosen. An object could only be necessary if it were impossible, given the nature of the object and the willing subject, that the effect (the object chosen) could be otherwise. God as the first cause, however, makes the choice of a particular object certain — it could not be otherwise. So, how is it not the case that God’s agency makes man’s agency necessary, not contingent, since it is impossible that it could be otherwise?

Not surprisingly, the answer requires a further distinction where “something can be necessary in one respect, whereas it is simultaneously contingent in another respect” (p. 35). Is this a case of having your cake and eating it too? Perhaps, but it all goes back to the quote I gave above about the non-manipulative agency of God and how that is to be conceived. In the meantime, it is important to recognize that the Reformed believed that any object/event/choice (p) is not necessary “itself”:

…the Reformed made it clear that if God knows p, then the existence of p itself is not necessary; p is only necessary on the supposition of God’s knowing. (p. 37)

Thus, the consequence is necessary, but not the consequent; that is, the result is necessary but not according to the properties intrinsic to the objects themselves (whether the cause or the effect, which are contingent). In itself, p is still contingent (could be otherwise); as an object of God’s knowledge, p is necessary (could not be otherwise).

So it seems to me that the veracity of the Reformed position depends upon the credibility of their belief that God acts in and with the human will such that the human will acts freely among different possibilities. This requires the further distinction about the human will acting spontaneously, not coerced, which will be the subject of the next part in this review series.

‘Reformed Thought on Freedom’, pt. 2 (ontological concepts, a.k.a. the whole shebang)

This post continues a review series of Reformed Thought on Freedom (Baker, 2010), e.d. Willem J. van Asselt et al.

See part 1 (series introduction).

The first several pages of the first chapter, “Introduction,” which is co-written by the editors, deal with the historical background of both the issue at hand (the problem of free choice) and the recent scholarly turn toward a primary source reading of this issue in the Reformed church of the 16th-18th centuries. So, for example, the work of Dr. Antonie Vos is emphasized for bringing-out the medieval sources of Reformed Scholastic theology, especially John Duns Scotus on contingency. This section is brief but interesting, and it situates the reader to understand the motive behind the present book, which is to further the scholarly work of close attention to semantics and sources. Thus, the authors want the Reformed to be understood on their own terms, and not through the categories provided by their opponents (Arminian, Cartesian, etc.). And, now to the meat of the discussion.

The authors state that the Reformed were utilizing a particular form of logic called “modal logic.” As they state,

A modal term is an expression (like “necessarily” or “possibly”) that is used to qualify the truth of a judgment. Modal logic is, strictly speaking, the study of the deductive behavior of the expressions “it is necessary that” and “it is possible that.” However, the term “modal logic” may be used more broadly for a family of related systems. These include logic for explaining the concept of faith, tense and other temporal expressions, as well as deontic (moral) expressions and the logic of willing. (p. 28)

Or, to borrow from John Henry Newman, they are concerned with detailing a “grammar of assent,” with a focus on the objective (“ontological”) criteria for coming to faith and what must be said concerning the effective agency of both God and man. The importance of recognizing the precise semantic scope of the Reformed formulas is the most important part of the subsequent chapters, which each deal with a particular theologian. And, so, we will frequently visit the technical language involved. The Introduction does an outstanding job of providing an overview of this language so that the reader can then enter the subsequent chapters with a much-needed “heads up.”

The first ontological distinction is between cause and effect and their relation by either “necessity” or “contingency.” In the former case, the effect is determined by a “natural act”; in the latter case, the effect is determined by a “free act.” As the authors state,

A natural cause is determined by its nature to the act; a free cause determines itself by freedom to one of possible acts. Hence, determination refers to the state of a cause: being undetermined means that the (free) cause has not yet directed itself to a certain effect. A determined cause will produce its determined effect, but still the effect can be either contingent (determined by a free act) or necessary (determined by a natural act). (p. 31)

Thus, a natural act has only one “possibility operator” (Nd):

natural cause: Nd –> necessary effect (d)

While the free act is not limited to a single possibility operator (for example, Md and Me):

free cause: Md or Me –> contingent effect (d/e)

The importance of this distinction is seen when the claim is made that both God and man act concurrently as free acts. As the authors state,

In terms of the relation between God and man, both were held to be free causes. God as the First Cause (prima causa) and creatures as secondary causes (secundae causae) concur together in their acting to produce a contingent effect. We should be aware that this causal terminology does not imply a manipulative, causal relationship: God as the Creator initiates, sustains, empowers and governs all that exists, while leaving room for the causal activity of his creatures. God does not only stand at the beginning, but is present to every moment of time in providing life, powers, and possibilities for action. It should further be noticed that in this relationship God is independent of his creatures, while these are dependent on God. The secondary causes are contingent themselves, so they are dependent in their existence on him. (p. 32)

Or, to put this in a modal formula:

[(God) First cause: Md or Me / (man) second cause: Md or Me] –> [contingent effect (d/e)]

Obviously, we have come to the tricky part, where the most objections arise. Can the secondary cause really be claimed to have a freedom of choice where d and e are possibility operators? “Does the second cause keep a real freedom between different acts (both d and e), or does the determinate state of the effect leave only the option of d open?” (p. 32). The authors answer: “the divine choice for d is realized by the free choice of the second cause for it. So, the second cause keeps both possibilities, but is guided to choose by itself for d.” (p. 33)

Case closed! I’m glad that’s settled. Just kidding…we’ll continue in part 3 with a closer look at this important claim to be able to freely choose (“by itself”) yet determinate to one particular end.

‘Reformed Thought on Freedom’, review series

I ordered this book back in June ’09 when it was first “released.” I finally received it a few weeks ago when it was actually released…that’s Baker/Eerdmans for ya: they get the pre-orders and use that to anticipate the demand, i.e., how many copies to press. Oh well. Moving on…

This is a much-anticipated work coming from a group of scholars associated with the University of Utrecht and the Protestant Theological University in Utrecht. It is the latest volume in Baker’s “Texts & Studies in Reformation & Post-Reformation Thought,” which is part of the larger renaissance in Reformed Scholastic ressourcement, largely thanks to the labor of Professor Richard Muller. So far, I’ve read half of the book and am thoroughly impressed. I’m going to go back and blog through the book, chapter by chapter, highlighting what I think is most important and interesting.

The purpose of the book is to explicate the Reformed understanding of free choice in the generations after Calvin, ending with Bernardinus de Moor in the 18th century. The authors are trying to understand what the Reformed theologians meant by “will,” “freedom,” “coercion,” “violence,” “spontaneity,” “contingency,” et cetera. For example, what does the Westminster Confession mean when it states:

God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

This is a historical study, but the authors do assert the cogency of the Reformed position, as against those (then and now) who reject the Calvinist synthesis of God’s determinism and human choice. As a way to wet your appetite, here are the first few paragraphs from the first chapter, “Introduction”:

“We establish free choice far more truly than our opponents.” The Reformed theologian Francesco Turrettini (1623-1687) made this rather surprising contention against contemporary advocates of freedom, the Jesuits, Remonstrants and Socinians, who complained that the Reformed categorically deny free choice. The Reformed account of predestination and providence was held to imply “Stoic fate.” Ever since, a deterministic interpretation of Reformed thought seemed obvious.

The Reformed scholastics themselves, however, were not impressed by this critique. They certainly confessed a foundational involvement of God’s will in creation and the history of salvation. Yet, for them this insistence on divine will precisely established a realm for human willing. Being constituted in freedom, reality is open for human freedom as well. God himself, acting freely, enables human beings — who are made in his image — to act freely alike.

This rather daring interpretation of Reformed thought on freedom is mainly complicated in two ways. First, the contemporary notion of freedom in an autonomous, libertarian sense does not allow any creational dependence or divine guidance in human acting. In this sense, divine willing must exclude human freedom. As we will see, however, the Reformed dismissed autonomy as a proper interpretation of freedom.

Second, the theological concept of freedom was taken in a normative sense in scholastic theology. Being faced with the choice between good and bad, only rightly willing was taken to be properly free. A will in bondage to sin was denied to be free, though it acted freely in its own choice to sin. This sometimes rather definite denial of human freedom has to be taken as an explicit endorsement of the Reformed sola gratia: only divine grace enables to do good. Underlying this theological concept of normative freedom, however, was a more basic philosophical concept of freedom, which made it possible to articulate sin as freely choosing to do evil.

We are convinced that the sources of Reformed theology present a balanced view on human freedom. Accordingly, this volume offers translations and analyses of some important theological texts on free choice from the era of early-modern Reformed theology. …

See Part 2 and Part 3 of my review.