Knowledge in Romans 1, per Barth

My contribution to the Barth Blog Conference was posted a couple days ago on Travis’ blog (click here). The topic is Barth’s rejection of natural theology in his Shorter Commentary on Romans. Shannon’s argument is that (1) Barth is doing exegesis, intending to let Paul speak for himself, and (2) Barth’s exegesis is correct, i.e., Paul and Barth are in agreement. In my response, I affirm the former and dispute the latter. Here is an excerpt, my argument in nuce:

And now we come to my criticism. Given this wholly foreign knowledge of God, hidden until the work of Christ, Barth declares that “it would be very strange indeed, if Paul suddenly regarded the Gentiles as being in full participation and possession of a genuine knowledge of God” (p.15). The difficulty I have with such a statement is that Barth is filling-in the idea of “knowledge” with such terms as “full participation” and “possession” of a “genuine knowledge” of God and contrasting this with the idea of knowledge in the first chapter of Romans, in particular, knowledge of God by the Gentiles “ever since the creation of the world.” This language of “full participation,” etc., heavily tilts the argument in Barth’s favor, but I believe Paul is working with a more limited understanding of knowledge: a genuine knowledge of God but without the soteriological value and definitional content. Thus, famously, Paul is able to say that God’s “eternal power and divine nature” is known through “the things he has made” (1:20), yet “though they knew God, they did not honor him as God (1:21). Also, more critically, Paul ends the section with, “They know God’s decree, that those who practice such things deserve to die…” (1:32). A certain knowledge of God is made available to the Gentiles outside of Christ, though it is knowledge that only leaves them in condemnation. It lacks the object of saving faith.

Accountability and Apologetics

I occasionally engage in discussions on various intra-Christian blogs related to ecclesial apologetics. I have no problem with such apologetics. It is necessary that Catholics, Orthodox, and the varied Protestants defend their ecclesial stance and relate it to the average layperson. The problem is when the apologetic claims are untethered from what is known (or the related probabilities), which necessarily requires the work of scholars. If a Catholic claims that the “early Church” was under the juridical authority of the See of Rome, then something is wrong. That is akin to a Protestant claiming that scripture as canon and authority developed apart from a Church, with bishops, and an assumed tradition or rule of faith. That sort of ahistorical presentation may win converts to your church, but under a guise of misinformation (illusion).

The apologist, thus, must be held accountable to scholarship, as the scholars are held accountable by peer review (imperfect, to be sure). The apologist is, thus, a mediator between the scholar and the layperson. The typical layperson does not have the time or skill to engage with upper-level theology and historical research — nor should they, when responsibilities lay elsewhere. The apologist, however, must. If the apologist cannot or refuses to do so, he or she should not be an apologist. The average, inquiring layperson is, to some degree, at the mercy of the person mediating the information. We cannot expect the inquirer to fully adjudicate the information given, but we can expect the apologist to come under judgment from fellow apologists and scholars.

We cannot escape this need for the apologist nor the need for accountability. All truth is ultimately tested in the court of our subjectivity, but all truth inheres in reality — the real world “out there.” Attending to this reality is the only remedy for solipsism.

“Realism” defined

The following is T. F. Torrance’s elucidation of the term, “realism.” It works as a very good definition. Don’t let the “Torrance-speak” throw you off: e.g., “a break in the semantic relation” just means “an untruth” or “telling falsely.”

The contrast between realism and idealism, implied in the use of either term, evidently has its source in the distinction we make between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified. This is a natural operation of the human mind, for it belongs to the essence of rational behavior that we can distinguish ourselves as knowing subjects from the objects of our knowledge, and can employ ideas or words to refer to or signify realities independent of them. Normally our attention in knowing, speaking, listening, or reading is not focused upon the ideas or words we use, far less upon ourselves, but upon the realities they signify or indicate beyond themselves. Hence in our regular communication with one another we use and interpret signs in the light of their objective reference. Thus the natural operation of the human mind would appear to be realist.

We use these distinctions, then, between subject and object, idea and reality, or sign and thing signified, naturally and unreflectingly, and only turn a critical eye upon them when something arises to obscure signification, such as a break in the semantic relation. Much now depends upon where the emphasis falls, upon the signifying pole or the objective pole of the semantic relation, that is, upon idea or reality, upon sign or thing signified.

…we shall use the term [realism], not in an attenuated dialectical sense merely in contrast to idealism, nominalism, or conventionalism, but to describe the orientation in thought that obtains in semantics, science, or theology on the basis of a nondualist or unitary relation between the empirical and theoretical ingredients in the structure of the real world and in our knowledge of it. This is an epistemic orientation of the two-way relation between the subject and object poles of thought and speech, in which ontological primacy and control are naturally accorded to reality over all our conceiving and speaking of it. It is worth noting that it was a realist orientation of this kind which Greek patristic theology, especially from the third to the sixth century, struggled hard to acquire and which it built into the foundations of classical theology. [Ditto for relativity theory in 20th century science.]

Thomas F. Torrance, Reality and Evangelical Theology, pp. 58-60.

Paul Moser on Kerygmatic Philosophy

The blog of the Evangelical Philosophical Society has an interesting interview with Paul Moser, professor of philosophy at Loyola University Chicago (published books). It serves as a good intro to Moser’s work, especially his formulation of, what he calls, “kerygmatic philosophy” (see The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, Cambridge 2008). I particularly liked this bit from the interview:

Who are some thinkers that have influenced your reflection and development of kerygmatic philosophy and its significance?

My perspective on philosophy and epistemology is based on various New Testament writers, particularly Paul and John. I read the Gospel of John as an inherently epistemological gospel, offering the basics of an epistemology of human knowledge of God. I read some sections of Paul’s letters as similarly epistemological, for instance, 1 Cor. 1-2, Rom. 5, 8. It’s noteworthy that the New Testament writers show no need of arguments of natural theology. They do, however, make important cognitive use of the human experience of God’s call, and they acknowledge the importance of the human will in apprehending evidence of divine reality (see, e.g., Jn. 7:17; 1 Jn. 4:8). For some Pauline remarks on God’s call, see, for instance, 1 Cor. 1:9; cf. 1 Cor. 1:2, 26, 7:17–24, Rom. 1:6–7, Eph. 1:18-19. For 20th-century efforts to preserve the central role of God’s call in philosophy and theology, see Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, and the works of two evangelical Quaker Christians, Rufus Jones and Thomas R. Kelly (especially the latter’s Testament of Devotion).

The Logic and Limits of Revelation

The T&T Clark blog has a fascinating review of an upcoming book by Rolfe King. These are vitally important matters, and as such they can be handled terribly wrong (and often are). So, I’ll be interested to read how he handles it all. I do think the “trustworthiness” motif (vis-à-vis the problem of evil) is spot on. Here’s the review:

This is a bold and imaginative book that puts forward the thesis that there are, by the nature of the created order, aspects of creaturely existence that block or hinder some forms of divine disclosure thus necessarily shaping the way in which God discloses himself. It proposes that there is a logically given structure to revelation, which God, if there is such a being, must work within. By implication the thesis seeks to sharpen our understanding of what kinds of knowledge of God we can expect to find and the nature of the faith that apprehends revelation. It also suggests that the concepts of omnipotence and freedom, when applied to God, need more careful analysis than is sometimes allowed.

King’s argument emerges out of a rigorous conversation with major historical and contemporary figures in theology and philosophy, such as Calvin, Barth, Kant, Kierkegaard, Swinburne, Plantinga, Alston, Phillips and Hick, amongst others, and sets itself the distinctive task of exploring theological ideas of the hiddenness and mystery of God through a careful philosophical analysis of revelation and faith. The writer argues that there are a number of epistemic features of human existence that give shape to the way in which God can reveal himself. God’s revelation as encoded in texts, as well as more direct forms of disclosure have the character of self-testimony. If these are to be received as revelations of the existence and loving character of God, then there must be trust in the being who is self-testifying. Trust, in turn, is dependent on a person’s immersion, and intellectual and emotional growth within an evidential context that teaches them why they ought to trust God and how they can rightly perceive God’s revelation. This is to say that revelation can only be received from within a context that nurtures a sense of God’s trustworthiness; revelation can only be received as and when trust develops. The importance of the trustworthiness of God to faith explains, in the writers view, why the problem of evil is a significant issue. It is because it weakens the hold of the believer’s trust in the good purposes of God. Moreover the perspective of the writer leads him to describe faith in terms of a journey epistemology. By this is meant that faith depends on evidenced based trust in God trustworthiness that leads a person to belief God’s self-disclosures and which begins with an explicit decision to trust that becomes gradually and over time an implicit, tacit trust in God and his disclosures.

A main virtue of the book is that it approaches familiar theological issues, such as the kenotic self-limitation of God in Christ, from the perspective and using the tools of analytical philosophy. The writer strives for conceptual clarity and rigorous argument throughout and gives a good account of a range of important thinkers in the course of his argument; the book would be well worth reading for its expository value alone! Through his careful discussions of numerous thinkers King puts forward a systematic and cohesive argument in support of his position. Along the way, moreover, he explores some of the ramifications of his position in relation to topics such as the form of human knowledge of God in the eschaton and the importance of miracles to God’s revelatory strategy.

The book is an excellent addition to the literature dealing with revelation. It would be useful to advanced students of theology and theologians, in that it posits a striking thesis that potentially illuminates some key theological concerns and it does this through drawing on the tools and insights of analytical philosophy of religion. It would be also be helpful to philosophers because it offers fair expositions of the work of many key thinkers and takes provocative, well-argued positions within a number of current debates in the field.

Adam Hood, Queen’s Theological Foundation

Obstacles to Divine Revelation is available in the UK from Jan 2009 and the US from March 2009.